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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
EARL WARD CLEMENTS,

Case No.

12400

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Clements appeals from a conviction of second degree
burglary in the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Calvin Gould, judge, sitting without
a jury, found Clements guilty of second degree burglary
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (1969 Supp.) and
sentenced him to not less than one nor more than twenty
years in the Utah State Prison.
Clements appeals from that conviction and sentencmg.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
State seeks affinnance of the judgment of the lower
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Clements and another were caught inside the Ogden
Clinic late at night on April 18, 1970. After first being
confronted by a police officer, Clements and his friend
ran dovm a corridor and were both later found hiding in
the building (R. 42-43, 62-63). Where Clements was
found to be hiding there was also found a loaded .357
l\fa_gnum lying under .1 piece of foam (R. 49). Another
gun was also found in Clements' car (R. 70-73).
Testimony in the trial court showed that Clements
and his friend had not been authorized to enter the clinic
(R. 40, 68). There was also testimony indicating that at
about 5: 30 p.m. on April 18, 1970 all of the windows and
doors were shut and secured (R. 66). Officers testified
that two screwdrivers were found on the floor in the front
of the building and that a window had been broken inward in the building (R. 64, 69-70). A police officer testified that he saw Clements and his friend trying to unlock
or pry open an inside door (R. 43) .
Clements was charged with second degree burglary
and an habitual crimin~l violation in two separate cases.
These cases were consolidated for the same trial (R. 18).
Because Clements and his friend were both charged on
second degree burglary dealing with the same factual situation, Judge John F. Wahlquist suggested that the two
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defendants might be tncd together if the State would filP
the proper motion for consolidation (R. 18).
On June 29, 1970 a motion for consolidation was filed
by the State and on October 5, 1970 before Judge Ronald
0. Hyde the cases of the two defendants were consolidated
for trial and the habitual cri.>ninal charges were dismissed
(R. 26).
The trial took place on November 10, 1970 wherein
the transcript shows that the Honorable Calvin Gould,
Judge reviewed the consolidation matters with the defendants' attorneys (R. 37). Judge Gould also interrogated
the defendant regarding his waiver of a jury trial (R. 3637). The trial proceeded as a consolidated trial before the
Honorable Calvin Gould sitting without a jury. The defendants were both founn guilty of second degree burglary
and sentenced to prison.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SHOW THAT CLEMENTS HAD THE NECESSARY INTENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONV I C T I 0 N OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY.
Clements contends that the evidence presented in the
trial court was insufficient to show that the defendant had
the requisite specific intent to commit the crime of burglary in the second degree. This offense, as outlined by
the Utah Code, has a specified intent:
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"Every person who forcibly breaks and enters,
or without force enters an open door, window or
other aperture, of any house, room, apartment,
tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable,
outhouse, or other building, or any tent, sheep or
cattle camp, vessel, watercraft, railroad car, automobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or aircraft
with intent to commit larceny or any felony, is
guilty of burglary in the second degree." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (1969 Supp.) (Emphasis
added.)
It should be noted that proof of the commission of
a larceny or a felony is not required by the statute but
rather that the defendant's intention to commit a larceny
or felony be shown. Because the true intent of the individual may only be known by himself, the proof of specific
intent in criminal matters can only be shown through
circumstantial evidence. The Utah cases dealing with tbt!
required standard of proof in second degree burglary cases
clearly point this out.
In the case of State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.
2d 490 (1958), the defendant contended that as a matter
of law there was insufficient evidence to directly prove
that he had the requisite intent for the crime of burglary.
Defendant has been apprehended coming out of a foundry.
The foundry had been locked and the defendant had not
been authorized to make entry. Evidence showed that a
window in the foundry had been broken and that locks
on a door had been tampered with. Nothing was found
to have been stolen from the foundry and the defendant
had been drinking but was not drunk according to any
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visible signs. This court said in relationship to the sufficiency of the evidence and proof of intent:
"Nor can it be said as a matter of law that
from all the facts and circumstances in this case a
jury could not reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary intent to commit larceny
or any other felony. No attempt was made to explain appellant's breaking and entering the foundry in the nighttime, nor does there appear any
lawful motive for such entry. Under such circumstances a reasonable inference from the evidence
is that the entry was made for the purpose of committing larceny or some other felony. Intent is
usually proved by acts and conduct. (citation
omitted)." State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 309,
324 P. 2d 490, 491 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
The court held in circumstances very similar to the
case presently before the court that the reasonable inference from finding an individual having broken into a
building that he has not been authorized to enter is that
he has entered the building with the purpose of committing larceny or a felony.
Clements, in the case before us, was found inside a
building that he had not been authorized to enter. The
building had been locked and secured the previous evening. A window was found broken by which it was assumed
Clements and his friend obtained access. The defendants
were seen trying to pry open an inner door and when confronted by the police officer, fled to another pa1't of the
building. Clements was found hiding in a utility closet
and where he was hiding a gun was also found.
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It is the State's contention that under these circumstances " ... [A] reasonable inference from the evidence
is that entry was made for the purpose of committing
larceny or some other felony." Id.

Another case directly in point is State v. Hopkins,
11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P. 2d 486 (1961). This was another
case where the <lefendant contended that there was no
direct proof of his intent to commit larceny and that the
proof of intent was made entirely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The defendant in Hopkins fled the
scene and was later apprehended. At first he claimed no
connection with the offense but later admitted being in
the dwelling of another. Hopkins offered an explanation
of his presence in the apartment but his testimony was
evidently not believed as the jury found him guilty. This
court in affirming the conviction stated:
"It is to be remembered that intent, being a
state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof.
But it can be inferred from conduct and attendant
circumstances in the light of human behavior and
experience. It is upon that basis that authorities
uniformly affirm that where one breaks and enters
into the dwelling of another in the nighttime, without the latter's consent, an inference may be drawn
that he did so to commit larceny. This, coupled
with defendant's other inculpatory conduct described above, including his flight from the scene,
which itself may be regarded as some evidence of
guilt, provide ample proof to support the verdict."
State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 365, 359 P. 2d
486, 487 (1961).
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This court's position in respect to the presumption
of intent to commit larceny when found in the building
of another without consent was reaffirmed. In the case
at bar, as in the Hopkins case, the defendant fled the
scene which operates as further circumstantial evidence
of guilt.
Under these standards for the proof of intent to commit larceny or a felony the judge properly ruled that there
was sufficient evidence to establish guilt. Because the
judge was sitting without a jury it was his duty to apply
the law to the facts of the case and find Clements guilty
of second degree burglary. The evidence regarding intent
being sufficient, the determination of the trial court judge
should not be disturbed.
POINT II.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-3 (1969 SUPP.)
IS NOT VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS OR UNCERTAIN AND SHOULD BE UPHELD AS CONSTITUTIONAL.
There is a "long established presumption in favor of
the constitutionality of a statute," Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 354 (1936). This
presumption has been relied on by the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah in State v. Nielson, 19 Utah 2d 66, 426
P. 2d 13 (1967) wherein the court stated:
"The general rule of statutory construction is
to hold an enactment of the legislature valid unless
it clearly appears to violate some provision of the
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constitution of this State or of the United States."
Id. at 69. See also Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah
2d 138, 434 P. 2d 449 (1967) and Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431,
446 P. 2d 958 (1968).
With this presumption in mind the particular statute
in question should be analyzed. Clements contends that
the second degree burglary statute became vague and uncertain, in respect to intent, with the amendment of 1969
which eliminated the "nighttime" requirement. The requirement of intent to commit larceny or a felony remained the same in the 1969 amendment of the second
degree burglary statute. Without a specific change in the
law related to intent the new law must be construed consistent with the prior statute.
"The provisions of any statute, so far as they
are the same as those of any prior statute, cshall
be construed as a continuation of such provisions,
and ... not as a new enactment." Utah Code Ann.
§ 68-3-6 ( 1953) .
The only portion of the second degree burglary statute that was changed was the requirement that the breaking and entering must be at night. An amendment which
eliminates the "nighttime" requirement would help to
make the statute more certain and eliminate possible ambiguities as to when it is, or is not, "nighttime."
The second degree burglary statute should not suffer
a vagueness attack because a new misdemeanor has been
created for entering "with intent to damage property or
to injure a person or annoy the peace and quiet of any

occupant therein." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-9 (1969 Supp.).
The plain meaning of the words adequately define a different offense in the case of the misdemeanor than as
found in the second degree burglary statute.
The second degree burglary statute, as amended in
1969, should be construed as constitutional in light of the
rule that statutes should be construed as constitutional
whenever possible. (See Ashwander, Nielson, Gord and
Trade Commission cases, supra.) Clements' vagueness
attack has been against the intent requirement of the
statute which has not changed and should receive a statutory construction consistent with prior law. The second
degree burglary statute is valid and constitutional.

POINT III.
CLEMENTS WAS GIVEN A FAIR AND
SPEEDY TRIAL WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS.
Clements raises several allegations of prejudice or
unfairness at the trial court. His basic contentions are:
Clements was tried concurrently with a co-defendant; he
was tried without a jury; the intoxication defense was not
raised; counsel had a pecuniary interest in the case; and,
there was a delay in transmitting the record on appeal.
These contentions basically question whether or not Clements received a fair and speedy trial within constitutional
standards.
The question of whether or not the two defendants
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in this burglary offense could be tried together was raised
in the lower court proceedings. After Judge John F.
\Vahlquist suggested that the two defendants might be
tried together, the State filed a proper motion for consolidation (R. 18). On October 5, 1970, before Judge Ronald
0. Hyde, the cases of the two defendants were consolidated (R. 26). At the actual trial on November 10, 1970,
Judge Calvin Gould reviewed the consolidation matter
\vith the attorneys of both defendants (R. 36). At no
time was the consolidation objected to and Clements
points to no specific prejudice resulting from the consolidation.
Clements also raises a question regarding his right
to a jury trial. A look at the record shows that Judge
Gould seoarately interrogated both defendants regarding
their waiver of jury trial. In respect to Clements, the
transcript reveals:
THE COURT:
Clemons (sic) ?

And you are Earl Ward

MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: And you understand you have
a right to a jury trial, Mr. Clemons (sic)?
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: There would be eight persons
empaneled and the District Attorney would have
to convince all eight of them as to your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes.
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THE COURT: Their verdict would have to
be unanimous. You have talked to Mr. Adams,
who is your attorney, about this?
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes your Honor.
And I felt my own self I would leave it up to the
descretion of your Honor.
THE COURT: You would like to waive the
right and have the Court try the factual issues?
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Right, your Honor
(R. 36-37).
It is clear from the Record that Clements knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to jury trial Justice
would not be served by allowing Clements to now com·
plain of possible trial errors which he participated in creating.

Clements' counsel in the trial court did not raise the
intoxication defense nor did he move for a possible mistrial when the judge's decision was announced. A hindsight look at the trial outcome and a criticism of trial
tactics does not provide grounds for reversal.
Cases hold that the constitutional right to counsel is
not violated unless an attorney's performance reduces the
trial to a farce or a sham through lack of competence, diligence or knowledge of the law. In re Beaty, 51 Cal. Rptr.
521, 64 C. 2d 760, 414 P. 2d 817 (1966). See also Baron
v. State, 7 Ariz. App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975 (1968) and
Gresham v. Page, Okla. Cr., 441 P. 2d 478 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U. S. 916 (1968). The defendant was granted
a right to counsel through court appointment and the
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Record shows that Mr. Adams performed his duties in
a competent manner.
The delay in having the Record transmitted to the
Supreme Court for appeal does not constitute a breach
of a constitutional right. The Utah Supreme Court has
said regarding a two-week delay in a trial court proceeding:
"Under the circumstances here, where no one
was intentionally prejudiced by the two-week delay. The ends of justice were not aborted.... Unreasonable release of felons on technicality, resulting in their freedom to continue plying in their
trade, by superficial resort to strained, technical
construction of a statute or constitution becomes
the shield for the miscreant, and the cross of decent
citizenry which some time could lead to a tea
party and volley of fire across a bridge." State v.
Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 203, 418 P. 2d 134,
135 (1966). See also United States v. Ewell, 383
u. s. 116 (1966).
It should be noted that Clements raises the question
of speedy trial not in connection with the constitutionally
safeguarded trial court proceedings but with the state
g-.canted appellate proceedings.
In a recent Tenth Circuit case the question ·of appellate delay as a violation of due process of law was considered. The court held:
"Ash's appeal was docketed in the appellat~
court on November 6, 1968 and ultimately decider!
on July 22, 1969, despite the unexplained loss of
the record on appeal which necessitated its dupliC?

._.

L·lvn.
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"We hold that under the circumstances, there
was no inordinate, excessive or inexcusable delay
rendering the conviction void, as urged by Ash."
Ash v. Turner, No. 692-69 (April 6, 1970).
A similar fact situation has been presented by Clements. There has been no prejudice shown by the delay
in transmitting the transcript and there has been no violation of constitutional rights.
Clements has alleged that he did not receive a fair
trial by reciting conclusory statements about how the
trial might have been improved. The Record shows nfJ
facts wherein the defendant was specifically prejudiced
at the trial court level. Mere hindsight as to how a trial
might have been cannot be the basis for overturning the
decision of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the evidence brought before the
trial court clearly showed that Clements had the requisite
intent to sustain the conviction of second degree burglary.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (1969 Supp.) is not vague and
should be construed in a manner consistent with its prede
cessor and should be upheld as constitutional. Clements
was granted a fair and speedy trial and the conviction of
the lower court should therefore be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAURENN.BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

